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CHRIST'S ATONEMENT AS THE
MODEL FOR CIVIL JUSTICE
JEFFREY

C.

TUOMALA

Nothing is more influential with men than examples of justice.
Valerius Maxim us 1

God presented him [Christ Jesus] as a sacrifice of atonement,
through faith in his blood. He did this to demonstrate his justice,
because in his forbearance he had left the sins committed beforehand unpunished [.]
Paul the Apostle'

The implications of the various theories of punishment for sentencing
and spending policies are well known. Less familiar, though more
intriguing, is the relationship these theories bear to basic criminal
law doctrines of legality, mens rea, and defenses. Several current
casebooks start with a section on punishment and develop this
relationship with varying degrees of success.' Tying resolution of
substantive law issues to the basic philosophical questions involved
in the theories of punishment enriches the study of criminal law, 4
but it increases frustration and breeds cynicism when those questions
remain unanswered. Neither policymaker nor jurist can confidently
make decisions without justifying a theory of punishment. 5
The critical importance of Christian theology in the development
of Western criminal law is well documented. 6 Legal doctrines are
justified by, and maintain coherence as part of, a particular world view.
l. Hugo Grotius, A Defence of the Catholic Faith Concerning the Satisfaction

of Christ, against Faustus Socinus (Frank H. Foster, trans. 1889) (1st ed. 1617,
translated from Amsterdam ed. 1679), p. 98.
2. Romans 3:25 (all quotations from New International Version).
3. See, Peter W. Low et al., Criminal Law (1986), pp. 1-28; Richard G. Singer
and Martin R. Gardner, Crimes and Punishment (1989), pp. 45-211.
4. See, H. L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (litho. reprint 1970) (1968);
C.L. Ten, Crime, Guilt, and Punishment (1987).
5. The problem seems no closer to a resolution today than one hundred years
ago when Sir Henry Maine observed: "All theories on the subject of punishment
. have more or less broken down, and we are at sea as to first principles." J.M.
Finnis, "Old and New in Hart's Philosophy of Punishment," 8 The Oxford Rev.
(1968), p. 73.
6. See Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western
Legal Tradition (1983), and sources cited therein.
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What happens when the positive rules of the state lose all touch
with a higher law and come to be seen as nothing more than the
outcomes of a power struggle? Can the ideals of autonomy and
generality in law survive the demise of the religious beliefs that
presided over their birth?'

The doctrine of Christ's atonement is of singular importance for
theories of punishment as it is the judicial archetype of the way in
which God deals with sin and crime. Treatises on the atonement are
rich with illustrations from, and analogies to, the civil law. Remarkable
parallels appear between the four principal views of Christ's atonement
and currently debated theories of civil justice. The civil magistrate,
as "minister of God for justice," should deal with crime and civil
wrongs according to the same principles by which God deals with
sin through the atonement. The justification of a particular theory
of atonement justifies a corresponding view of civil justice. 8
THE MEANING OF ATONEMENT

Because of the centrality of atonement in the Christian faith its
meaning is as varied as theological systems are diverse. However, all
views hold in common that the end of atonement is the reconciliation
of God and man. Properly understood, atonement establishes the
ground of justice for reconciliation between an offended party and
the offender. Similarly, civil justice should establish the ground of
justice for reconciliation of victim and offender and the restoration
of both.
There are two paramount questions to be answered in studying the
atonement. The first is whether Christ's death was necessary as the
· only means of salvation. The second is whether the primary purpose
of Christ's death was to change God's disposition toward man or
man's disposition toward God.
If Christ's death were not a necessary satisfaction of justice in the
divine nature then it was merely an arbitrary product of divine will
subject to change. In such a case Christ's death would be based
7. Roberto M. Unger, Law in Modern Society (1976), p. 83.
8. A more direct "religious" approach to justifying a theory of punishment
would be to study the civil law sections of scripture, but there are three distinct
advantages to approaching the issue through the atonement. The scriptures treat
Christ's death much more comprehensively, as redemption is the central theme of
the Bible. Secondly, the principles of justice as reflected in the atonement have
received far greater attention than the civil law, so there is more to draw from.
Thirdly, general principles of justice are not as clear from the biblical case law, and
that case law often has the appearance of being time-bound.
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simply on its suitability for accomplishing a particular end, for
example, deterring sin or moving man to repentance. In a world
where the archetype of justice is mutable there is little reason to
expect standards of civil justice to be fixed. Justice as desert would
be replaced with the utilitarian principle that justifies conduct by the
test of expediency.
While the first question relates to means (atonement), the second
relates to the end (reconciliation). Where sin is a personal offense
against God, which elicits a personal response of judicial displeasure,
God's disposition toward man must be dealt with first. God cannot
simply ignore sin, but rather requires satisfaction of justice. The
sinner's reconciliation to God can only follow upon God's
reconciliation to man. Alternatively, if sin is merely a sickness or
impersonal offense against the good order of God's government,
then only man's disposition toward God need be changed to restore
their relationship. The focus would be on future rather than past
behavior, and justice's only demand would be personal reformation.
Where crimes are seen as offenses against individuals rather than
against an impersonal state, satisfaction must be made to the victim
and the demands of justice. The criminal's hatred of his victim may
still exist, but the objective ground for reconciliation has been laidhe has made satisfaction to the victim, and his own guilt is removed.
When the civil justice system focuses on changing the criminal's
behavior or character, the victim is left with a sense of injustice and
the offender with a burden of guilt. The opportunity for reconciliation
and restoration is lost.
THE FOUR Vmws OF ATONEMENT AND

CrviL JusTICE

The satisfaction, governmental, moral influence, and mystical
theories of atonement' correspond to retribution, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and social justice. 10 The satisfaction theory teaches
that justice is an immutable attribute of God's character demanding
9. There are various schemes for categonzmg the theories. This particular
scheme, with some variations, is found in numerous evangelical Calvinist and
Arminian theologies of the past two centuries.
10. Although it is common to treat retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation as
the chief theories of criminal sanctions, it is not at all usual to list social justice as
a category. I have done this for several reasons. Critical theories of criminology are
a type of social justice theory and do not fall under the traditional categories. Also,
Christ's atonement has an importance for civil justice that goes beyond punishment.
And finally, even the issue of punishment, narrowly defined, cannot be properly
addressed and understood except in a larger context.
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full payment of the law's penal and compensatory sanctions for
man's sin. It alone holds that Christ's vicarious death was necessary
to satisfy justice as a condition of salvation, and that its primary
effect was to change God's judicial disposition toward man. Likewise,
only retribution requires punishment based on moral desert and does
not focus on its prospective effect on the offender.
The governmental and moral influence theories concede that man
deserves punishment, but they deny that anything in God's nature
requires it. Christ's work is not a vicarious satisfaction of justice,
but rather the most efficient means of inducing a change of behavior,
either through fear by his exemplary death (governmental) or through
love by his exemplary life and death (moral influence). Deterrence
and rehabilitation similarly justify sanctions in terms of their utility
in promoting the social goal of behavioral change through fear or
treatment.
Christ's death is basically irrelevant in the mystical theory which
teaches that through the incarnation humanity· is divinized, thus
effecting an essential oneness of God and man. Social justice theories
parallel this in that moral fault and sanctions are irrelevant to the
goal of promoting community or reconciliation of all within society.
Atonement theories cannot be viewed in isolation from the
theological systems to which they belong. A particular view of
atonement entails a view of human nature and of the Holy Spirit.
All of the atonement theories except satisfaction confuse the work
of Christ and the Holy Spirit and have a fallacious view of sin and
human nature. This has an important parallel in views of civil justice
which confuse the jurisdictions of church and state. Christ's work
establishes an objective basis for reconciliation by satisfying justice,
while the Holy Spirit makes reconciliation a subjective reality by
revealing truth and transforming lives. The state is entrusted with
the ministry of justice through the power of the sword," while the
church is entrusted the ministry of reconciliation 12 through the power
of the Spirit. Just as God has not given the church the sword of
steel necessary to exact justice, he has not given the state the sword
of the Spirit" necessary to transform the sin nature of wrongdoers
and reconcile parties.
11. Romans 13:4: "For he [the civil magistrate] is God's servant to do you
good. But if you do wrong be afraid, for he does not bear the sword for nothing.
He is God's servant, an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer."
12. 2 Corinthians 5:19b-20: "And he has committed to us the message of
reconciliation. We "re therefore Christ's ambassadors, as though God were making
his apPeal through us. We implore you on Christ's behalf: Be reconciled to God."
13. Ephesians 6:17.

JEFFREY C. TUOMALA
I.

A.

225

DEONTOLOGICAL THEORIES OF ATONEMENT AND CIVIL JUSTICE
SATISFACTION THEORY OF ATONEMENT

Anselm's (1033-1109) epic work, Why God Became Man," was the
first thorough and scientific exposition of the atonement. His most
significant contribution was the idea that man's salvation is conditioned
on demands of justice that only Christ's death could satisfy." Anselm
began with the premise that disobedience robs God of his due and
thus dishonors him. 16 To restore God's honor justice demands
punishment or satisfaction. 17 Since punishment would destroy man,
thereby thwarting God's creation purposes, he looks to satisfaction. 18
In Roman civil law, satisfaction meant paying the victim for the
wrong done, or returning a stolen item, plus an extra payment for
dishonoring the victim. 19 For several reasons man cannot render
satisfaction to God. First, he has a continuing duty of complete
obedience so he has nothing to pay for past wrongs. Second, his sin
incurs an infinite debt. And thirdly, his sin nature renders him
impotent to do good. 20 Since only God could make satisfaction, and
only man should, salvation necessitated the incarnation of Jesus
Christ, the God-man, whose death paid our infinite debt thus restoring
God's honor.' 1 His death was not a punishment for man or in man's
place. 22
Anselm drew on three sources of analogy for his theory. Both
Roman law and the church doctrine of penance provided models for
satisfaction (payment) and for punishment. The punishment model
was found in Roman public law and in the Church doctrine of
penance as self-inflicted injury. The satisfaction model was found in
Roman civil law and in penance as performance of some good or as

14. Anselm of Canterbury, in A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham
(Eugene R. Fairweather, ed. & trans. 1956), p. 100. The Library of Christian Classics
(John Bailie et al., eds. 1953-69), vol. 10.
15. Robert S. Franks, The Work of Christ (1962), p. 128: "Nowhere is his
theory more revolutionary."
16. A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham, bk. I, ch. xi.
17. Ibid., bk. I, ch. xix.
18. Ibid., bk. 2, ch. iv.
19. Ibid., bk. I, ch. xi.
20. Ibid., bk. I, ch. xx; bk. 2, ch. xiv; bk. I, ch. xxiv.
21. Ibid., bk. 2, ch. vi.
22. The Work of Christ, p. 137: "For the remarkable thing about Anselm's
theory is his distinction of satisfaction from punishment, and his avoidance of the
idea that Christ's satisfaction is the vicarious endurance of our punishment, whether
as self-inflicted or inflicted by God."
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a gift to God. Anselm based the justice of Christ's atonement not
on vicarious punishment but on payment as positive performance of
some good. 23 Germanic law focused on lost honor which could be
restored by punishment or payment that was calculated not on the
basis of moral demerit, but rather on the amount of harm done to,
and status of, the victim. For Anselm it became God's honor rather
than his righteousness that required satisfaction. 24
Anselm's reliance on the private law analogy became a vortex of
criticism. It is generally recognized that private debt may be forgiven
without injustice. It logically follows that Christ's death was not
necessary as God could have simply forgiven man's debt without
payment. To require either payment or punishment appears to negate
God's mercy.
The Protestant Reformers accepted Anselm's premise that Christ's
death was a necessary condition of man's salvation; however, they
believed that punishment is a necessary component of atonement.
Man must be punished, or Christ must vicariously endure the
punishment man deserves. This view, which John Calvin (1509-1564)
set out in the Institutes of the Christian Religion,'-' became the
measure of Protestant orthodoxy.
The Reformers taught that God created man righteous and governed
their relationship by a covenant of law, rewarding obedience with
life and disobedience with death. 26 All men were on probation in
Adam whose sin brought guilt and a sentence of death on all
mankind. As a result, everyone is born with a sin nature that
inevitably produces specific sinful acts, both of which deserve
punishment. 27 As sin is a personal offense against God and not
against an impersonal government, His judicial disposition toward
sin is one of wrath and determination to exact justice. 28
23. Ibid., pp. 135-37; See also, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the
Western Legal Tradition. pp. 68-72, 172-73.
24. The Work of Christ, pp. 138-40. See generally Law and Revolution: The
Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, pp. 49-84 (ch. 1).
25. John Calvin, The Institutes of the Christian Religion (Henry Beveridge,
trans. 1845, photolithoprint 1981). Modern works from the Reformed perspective
include Archibald A. Hodge, The Atonement (reprint 1987) (1867); Benjamin B.
Warfield, The Person and Work of Christ (Samuel G. Craig, ed. 1980); and John
·
Murray, Redemption Accomplished and Applied (1955).
26. The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. I, ch. xv; Genesis 1:27-29; 2:1517; 3:14-24. See also Exodus 24 and Deuteronomy 28 (these events were covenant
renewal ceremonies).

27. The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 2, cbs. i-iii and ch. xvi, para.
3; Romans 3:9-23; 5:12-21; Ephesians 2:3; Psalm 51:5. See also The Atonement,
ch. vii.
28. The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 2, ch. xvi, para. I; Psalm 51:34;- Romans 1:18.
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Yet even while man chose to be an enemy of God and was under
his wrath, God loved man and sent his son to fulfill all the demands
of justice in man's place by his life and his death. 29 Scripture
characterizes Christ's death not only as a punishment but as a
payment. Justice demands both. 30 An offender deserves to be punished
(retribution) and he owes payment (restitution) to the offended party.
Christ's judicially imposed death on Calvary as punishment and
payment was typified and prophesied in the Old Testament.' 1 While
Christ's death satisfied the negative aspects of the law, his life of
perfect obedience satisfied the positive requirements, meriting the
reward of eternal life. 32
God did not have to save man, but having chosen to, the only
means compatible with justice was Christ's substitutionary atonement.
He could not simply remit punishment nor accept less than full
satisfaction without himself acting unjustly. 33 In so doing he does
29. The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 2, ch. xvi, para.
not after we were reconciled to him by the blood of his Son that he
us, but he loved us before the foundation of the world, that with his
Son we too might be sons of God before we were anything at all.
Romans 5:9-11; Ephesians 2:4-5; Colossians 1:21; I John 4:7-12.
30. The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 2, ~h. xii, para.
25, at bk. 2, ch. xii, para. 3:

4: For it was
began to love
only-begotten
3: supra note

Therefore our Lord came forth very man, adopted the person of Adam, and
assumed His name, that he might in his stead obey the Father; that he might
present our flesh as the price of satisfaction to the just judgment of God, and
in the same flesh pay the penalty which we had incurred.
Isaiah 53:5: "But he was pierced for our transgressions, he was crushed for our
iniquities; the punishment that brought us peace was upon him, and by his woundS
we are healed." 1 Peter 2:24: "He himself bore our sins in his body on the tree,
so that we might die to sins and live for righteousness; by his wounds you have
been healed." Psalm 49:7-9: "No man can redeem the life of another or give to
God a ransom for him-the ransom for a life is costly, no payment is ever enough~
that he should live on forever and not see decay." 1 Peter 1:18-19: "For you know
that it was not with perishable things such as silver or gold that you were redeemed
from the empty way of life handed down to you from your forefathers, but with
the precious blood of Christ, a lamb without blemish or defect."
31. The ceremonial law, in particular the sacrificial system, is typical of Christ's
work on the cross (e.g., John 1:29; Hebrews 10:1-7). Redemption was both by
payment (e.g., the temple tax of Exodus 30:12-16, release of slaves in Leviticus
25:25-28, and cost of sacrificial offerings) and by substitutionary death (e.g., animal
sacrifices of Leviticus 1-7). See also The Atonement, ch. viii.
32. The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 2, ch. xvi, para. 5; bk. 2, ch.
xvii. Reformed theologians refer to Christ's death on the cross in satisfaction of
the negative demands of justice as his passive obedience while his life of sinless
perfection in satisfaction of the positive demands as his active obedience. By the
first he secured man's pardon; by the second he secured the reward of eternal life.
Romans 5:10; 6:5-7; Galatians 4:7. See also The Atonement, ch. xviii.
33. The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 2, ch. xii, para. I; Matthew
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not conform to a principle of justice that exists independently of
himself, but rather to the eternal personal attributes of his own
character. Since his very character is just, all of his laws and ways
reflect his justice. Justice is not the product simply of God's will,
but rather of his unchanging nature. 34
Through Christ's substitutionary death the objective ground for
the expiation (removal) of man's guilt, and thereby the propitiation
(appeasement) of God's wrath, was established. Christ's work is the
objective ground for God's reconciliation to man and man's to God."
As all men enter the world under the guilt of sin and wrath of God,
there remains a need to apply the benefits of Christ's work
experientially to individuals. This subjective application of the benefits
of the atonement is the work of the Holy Spirit."
Due to the moral corruption inherited from Adam no one is able
to satisfy the terms of the covenant of law." God has established a
new covenant that man might have forgiveness of sin and eternal
life on the condition of faith in Christ's work. 38 But his spiritual
condition is so desperate that he is unable to exercise faith as a
meritorious ground of salvation. The very faith by which he trusts
in Christ is a gift from God. 39 Because all men are hopelessly dead
in sin, it is only after a spiritual birth (regeneration) by the work of
the Holy Spirit that one can exercise this gift of faith. 40 Justified by
26:42; Romans 3:25-26; Galatians 2:21; Hebrews 9:22. Romans 3:25-26 is one of
the most important passages on the forensic significance of Christ's death. The
position that Christ's death was necessary is defended in C.E.B. Cranfield, The
Epistle to the Romans (1975), Vol. I, pp. 208-18; and John Murray, The Epistle to
the Romans (vol. 1 1959, vol. 2 1965), Vol. I, pp. 116-21.
34. Deuteronomy 32:4; Psalm 92:15; Matthew 5:48; Revelation 4:8. See also The
Atonement, ch. xvi.
35. The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 2, ch. xvi, para. 2: "[Christ]
with his own blood expiated the sins which rendered them hateful to God, by this
expiation satisfied and duly propitiated God the Father, by this intercession appeased
his anger, [and] on this basis founded peace between God and man .... " Romans
3:25; Hebrews 2:17; I John2:1-2; 4:10 (see King James Version for its rendering
of these verses).
36. Romans 8. See also The Atonement, ch. xiv.
37. The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 2, ch. iv, para. I; Romans 6:1523; 7:7-25.
38. All of the redemptive covenants with man since the fall have been covenants
of grace, including the Mosaic. The New Covenant is different not because it is a
covenant of grace rather than law, but because the mediator of that covenant is
Jesus Christ, God's own Son.
39. The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 2, ch. iii, para. 8; Ephesians
2:8-10.
40. Commenting on 2 Thessalonians 2:13 Calvin reminds the reader that "faith
itself is produced only by the Spirit." Ibid., bk. 3, ch. i, para. 4. Calvin further
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faith the believer no longer stands under the sentence of death. 41
God having been reconciled to man by the work of Christ, man is
now reconciled to God through the work of the Holy Spirit. But
salvation is both a crisis experience (regeneration and justification)
and a growth process (sanctification) in which the entire nature of
man is being transformed to conform to the image of God in which
he was created. 42 The believer is reconciled to God and is being
reconciled to God through the agency of the Holy Spirit. The
Reformers clearly distinguished the work of Christ establishing the
objective ground for reconciliation (redemption accomplished) and
the work of the Holy Spirit effecting an actual reconciliation
(redemption applied). All of the other views of atonement denigrate
the work of the Holy Spirit or deny his existence as a distinct person
in the Trinity.
B.

RETRIBUTION-RESTITUTION

There are several varieties of retributivism, which, despite their
negative connotation, have had numerous proponents past and
present. 43 It holds that criminals deserve punishment proportionate
to the moral blameworthiness of their offense. Punishment is not
justified by its usefulness as a means to attain the ends of reducing
crime or rehabilitating criminals. In its logical and strongest form
the magistrate must punish to the full measure of desert. 44
Retribution has several attractive features which most utilitarians
try to incorporate, only to compromise their own position. Since law
has a necessary moral content it places limits on what conduct can
be criminalized. In fact, the entire guilt-finding process with its focus
on mens rea is premised on the retributive presupposition that human
beings are morally responsible. 45 The state may punish only the guilty,
and punishment is limited by desert. 46 The retributive position gives
the entire criminal process, from criminalization to adjudication to
punishment, a coherence.
There are two basic approaches to justifying the retributive theory.
explains that "we require a transformation not only in external works but in the
soul itself." Ibid., bk. 3, ch. ill, para. 6. John 3:1-21; Ephesians 2:1; Titus 3:5-7.
41. Romans 8:1; See also Romans 1:17; 3:24; 5:1-9.
42. The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 3, ch; ii, para. 33: "For the
Spirit does not merely originate faith, but gradually increases it, until by its means
he conducts us into the heavenly kingdom." Ephesians 3:16-21.
43. See Crime, Guilt, and Punishment, ch. 3; John Cottingham, "Varieties of
Retribution," 29 The Phil. Q. (1979), p. 238.
44. I. Kant, Rechtslehre, pp. 195-97 (E. Hastie, trans. 1887), quoted in Edmund
L. Pincoffs, The Rationale of Legal Punishment (1966), pp. 2-3.
45. Punishment and Responsibility, pp. 28-53.
46. Ibid., pp. 1-27; Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction
(1968), pp. 62-70.
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The first is that it is a fundamental moral postulate based in some
theory of ethics, such as natural law or tradition. 47 The second
approach attempts to justify retribution as a necessary correlate of
some general political theory, such as social contract.•• This approach
is fairly well regarded, but it simply shifts the basic problem to that
of justifying the political theory.
There are three general forms of attack on the retributive theory.
The first is to portray it in pejorative terms as the unworthy sentiment
of vengeance thinly disguised.•• The second is to "expose" the
underlying ethical theory as little more than intuitionism. 50 The third,
and most important approach, is to level the charge that all varieties
of retributivism ultimately appeal to utilitarian arguments for
justification." C.L. Ten's summary and critique of retributive theories
focus on this issue. For example, Nozick's "nonteleological version"
of retribution argues that punishment reconnects offenders with moral
values. Ten asks why verbal declarations of these values will not do.
Nozick' s answer is that only punishment ensures these values will be
properly internalized. Ten argues that this is rehabilitation or deterrence
concealed as retribution. 52
This criticism may hold against most varieties of retributivism but
not all. Utilitarianism purports to justify those means which produce
the greatest good for the greatest number. It benefits from the
perception that it is scientific; however, empiricism is unable to
justify a vision of the good (ends) and proves to be an inadequate

47. SeeK. G. Armstrong, "The Retributivist Hits Back," 70 Mind (1961), pp.
471, 476-77; Jeffrie G. Murphy, "Three Mistakes about Retributivism," 31 Analysis
(1971), p. 166.
48. Jeffrie G. Murphy, "Marxism and Retribution," 2 Phil & Pub. Ajf (1973),
p. 217.

49. See Igor Primorac, "Is Retributivism Analytic?" 56 Philo. (1981), p. 203;
"The Retributivist Hits Back," -p. 471. The criticism frequently refers to, and
misconstrues, the principle of lex talionis, at least as that principle is found in the
Old Testament. The lex talionis is a rule of proportionality, not revenge. Even a
cursory reading of biblical law (e.g., Exodus 21: 18-27) makes it clear that it does
not Sanction a simplistic tit-for-tat system of mutilation or revenge. An example of
revenge that is the antithesis of biblical justice is found in Lamech's Song (Genesis
4:23-24). It is an example of deterrence through fear, with no limits of proportion-

ality.
50. "Three Mistakes about Retributivism," p. 166; Lawrence H. Davies, "They

Deserve to Suffer", 32 Analysis (1971-72), p. 136; H. J. McCloskey, "Utilitarian
and Retributive Punishment," 64 The J. of Phil. (1967), p. 91.
51. This is the main thrust of Ten's entire treatment of retributive theories.

Crime, Guilt, and Punishment, chs. 3-4. See also "They Deserve to Suffer," p.
137, critiquing S. Benn & R. Peters, The Principles of Political Thought (n.d.).
52. Crime, Guilt, and Punishment, pp. 44-46.
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methodology for choosing efficient means. These issues are addressed
more fully below after all the utilitarian views of civil justice have
been presented. The retributivist is just as concerned with promoting
the greatest good but without compromising his position. A Christian
view teaches that both the end (good) and means (satisfaction of
justice) are God-defined. Scripture teaches that God's glory and
man's happiness (end) are the consequence of obeying God's laws
(means)." The retributivist's assurance that he can know what is
truly good, and that the means are sufficient to that end, is based
on the belief in revealed truth and in a God-governed world."
To reflect the satisfaction theory, civil sanctions must include
restitution (payment to the victim) and retribution (payment to the
offender in cases of crime). Most retributivists have come to equate
criminal justice with punishment and are often careful to distinguish
restitution which is seen as a matter exclusively of tort law."
Despite this fact, there has been an increased concern for victims
of crime and their role in the justice system.'6 One aspect of this
concern has been to promote compensation and restitution, but these
schemes do not seem to fit under retribution, deterrence or
rehabilitation. Some writers promote restitution as a substitute for
punishment, which is the same error Anselm made believing justice
may be satisfied simply by payment." Without both restitution and
retribution there is no satisfaction of justice, and therefore, no
objective ground for reconciliation of parties to each other, or
offenders to the community. 58 Because most victims are without
means to pursue civil remedies, or the losses are too small to justify
litigation, there is a cumulation of unsatisfied victims and unreconciled
53. E.g., Deuteronomy 28; Romans 8:28-30; Ephesians 6:8.
54. A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham, bk. 2, ch. i.
55. The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, pp. 23-26; Crime, Guilt, and Punishment, pp. 38-41, 51-52.
56. Herbert W. Titus, "The Restitutionary Purposes of the Criminal Law," in
Crime and Punishment in Modern America (Patrick McGuigan & Jon S. Pascale,
eds. 1986), p. 273; Offender Restitution in Theory and Action (Burt Galaway & Joe
Hudson, eds. 1978); Considering the Victim (Joe Hudson & Burt Galaway, eds.
1975); Restitution in Criminal Justice (Joe Hudson & Burt Galaway, eds. 1975);
Stephen Schafer, Compensation and Restitution to Victims of Crime (2d ed. 1970);
Assessing the Criminal: Restitution, Retribution and the Legal Process (Randy E.
Barnett & John Hagel Ill, eds. 1977); Daniel Van Ness, Crime and Its Victims
(1986).
57. See Assessing the Criminal: Restitution, Retribution and the Legal Process,
p. 357; See also Richard A. Epstein, "Crime and Tort: Old Wine in Old Bottles,"
ibid.' p. 231.
58. Biblical law implements both restitution (e.g., Exodus 22:1-4) and retribution
(e.g., Exodus 21:12-17; Deuteronomy 25:1-3).
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offenders which leads to disillusionment and disrespect toward the
Jaw. Punishment is also necessary to satisfy justice from the victim's
and society's perspective. 59 The desire to see criminals punished need
not be irrational or vindictive, and we should be reluctant to call a
man good who does not respond with some indignation toward the
wickedness he sees in the world and satisfaction in seeing it punished.
Most writers do not address the question of whether the state has
a right to punish;"' however, it is answered in the course of showing
why Christ's atonement is the model for civil justice. Romans 1:1832 says that the "wrath of God is revealed from heaven" against all
sin, and that because of this revelation in nature and the conscience,
all men know they are under judgment. Romans 13: 1-7 says that
God established the state with the magistrate as his servant, who is
"an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer." As an
agent exercising delegated authority, the magistrate must administer
justice by the same principles that God dealt with all sin through
Christ's atonement.
The civil magistrate's authority, as delegated from God and modeled
on the atonement, is severely limited when compared to the· practices
of modern states. Contrary to conventional wisdom, 61 the sphere of
activities subject to state intrusion is limited by connecting Jaw and
morality. First, the state has no authority to criminalize acts that are
not morally wrong. The modern state is a major offender of this
principle. Second, even though God's judgment is against all sin,
including thoughts, the civil magistrate has authority only over
conduct. Third, he has authority to criminalize only some kinds of
immoral conduct. 62 Even though all crime is sin (immorality) not all
sin is to be punished as crime.
59. There are other authors who argue that the focus should not be primarily
on the offender. See Ronald J. Rychlak, "Society's Moral Right to Punish: A
Further Exploration of the Denunciation Theory of Punishment,'' 65 Tul. L. Rev.
(1990), p. 299. Rychlak focuses on the impact of punishment on law abiding society
rather than the victim. See also Richard Burgh, "Guilt, Punishment, and Desert,"
in Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions (Ferdinand Schoeman, ed. -1987), p.
316.
60. "The Retributivist Hits Back," pp. 473-74; Egon Bittner & Anthony Platt,
"The Right of the State to Punish," excerpted from "The Meaning of Punishment,"
2 Issues in Criminology (1966), vol. 2, p. 82, in Contemporary- Punishment: Views,
Explanations and Justifications (Rudolph J. Gerber & Patrick D. McAnany, eds.
1972), p. 24.
61. J.D. Mabbott, "Punishment," 49 Mind (1939), p. 152, reprinted in Theories
of Punishment (Stanley E. Grupp, ed. 1971), pp. 41, 43-44.
62. Unlike the first two principles, this principle cannot be drawn from the
Romans 13 passage or the principles of justice involved in Christ's atonement. It
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The principle of delegated authority places further strictures on
the state. It has no institutional authority to establish or administer
programs designed to change the character of offenders or potential
offenders." Although retribution-restitution's focus is essentially
backward-looking, by satisfying the demands of justice it restores
victims and expiates guilt thereby establishing a basis for reconciliation
of the offender to his victim, the community and himself.
As God's agent of grace the church also has an expressly delegated
and limited authority. Its institutional role includes proclaiming truth,
disciplining individuals and nations, feeding the poor, restoring
relationships, and promoting community. 64 To exercise this ministry
of reconciliation the church is entrusted with "the sword of the
Spirit," fulfilling its role as gifted and empowered by the Holy
Spirit. 65 Through the church's ministry the Holy Spirit applies the
salvation Christ secured. The reconciliation of man to God provides
the exclusive basis for the reconciliation of man to man and for true
community. 66 Just as there is a distinction between the work of Christ
and the work of the Holy Spirit, there is a corresponding separation
of state and church. The modern state is notorious for neglecting
justice and appropriating the role of the church, a role for which
the state is neither entrusted nor empowered.
II.

UTILITARIAN THEORIES OF ATONEMENT AND

CIVIL

JUSTICE

MoRAL INFLUENCE THEORY OF ATONEMENT
In his Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans67 Abelard (10791142) portrayed Christ's death as an exemplary demonstration of
God's love designed to elicit a loving response from man.•• He

A.

can only be prOven by an appeal more generally to principles of law and justice
found in scripture. Generally, the state in scripture has a limited subject matter
jurisdiction. As God's agent, with a ministry of justice, the state may use coercion
only in those situations where there is a delegation of authority.
63. Biblically this is the jurisdiction of the family (e.g., Deuteronomy 6:4-9;
Ephesians 6:4) and the church (e.g., Deuteronomy 33:10; Acts 2:42).
64. John 16:5-15; Romans 15:5; 2 Corinthians 5:11-21.
65. The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 2, ch. xvi, para. 16; Ephesians
6:17.
66. Psalm 133; John 17:23; Ephesians 4:1-6.
67. A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham, p. 276.
68. Ibid, p. 283:
Now it seems to us that we have been justified by the' blood of Christ and
reconciled to God in this way: through his unique act of grace manifested to
us-in that his Son has -taken upon himself our nature and preserved therein
in teaching us by word and example even unto death-he has more fully bound
us to himself by love; with the result that our hearts should be enkindled by
such a gift of divine grace, and true charity should not now shrink from
enduring anything for him.
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believed that God was willing and able to remit man's deserved
punishment without any satisfaction to the demands of justice. 69
Although Abelard taught that forgiveness of sin and reconciliation
to God are not conditioned upon Christ's satisfaction of justice, they
are conditioned upon man's moral reformation and obedience of the
law. 70 Man is justified by his own righteousness rather than the
imputation of Christ's righteousness. Christ's life, teaching, and death
were not a necessary manifestation of God's love, but they were the
most efficacious means of influencing this moral change. 71
Faustus Socinus (1539-1604) revived the moral influence theory in
De Jesu Christo Servatore (1594)'2 engaging in a virulent polemic
against the satisfaction theory. His basic premise was that punitive
justice is not an essential attribute of God's nature; therefore,
punishment may be remitted purely at will. Like Abelard, Socinus
taught that God had determined to remit punishment, not upon
satisfaction of justice, but upon condition of belief in Christianity
and obedience. 73 God pardons those who are reconciled to him in
response to Christ's loving example. 74
Socinus rejected the orthodox doctrines of sin, the divinity of
Christ, and the Trinity. He taught that the only effect of Adam's .
sin was to set a bad example. Consequently, man's moral condition
was not nearly as desperate as the Reformers believed. 7 ' Since Christ
was only a mortal man, though superior in many ways, he has no
exclusive role to play in salvation. Thus, all men have the potential
to exercise the same quality of saving influence over others through

69. lbid., p. 283.
70. Ibid., p. 279.
71. Ibid., p. 282.
72. This work [hereinafter De Jesu] has never been translated into English. See
The Polish Brethren (George H. Williams, trans., ed., & interpreter 1980), p. 255.
Franks' treatise on the atonement, The Work of Christ, pp. 362w73, contains portions
of De Jesu in English. The Racovian Catechism (1605) reflects Socinus' view of the
atonement and his theology in general.
73. Socinus writes that "[s]alvation proceeds from the mere will of God in
pardoning sinners, but is made known by Christ, the only further condition being
our faith and obedience." De Jesu, pt. I, ch. ii; The Work of Christ, p. 365. See
also- Racovian Catechism: "But when it is fitting t\lat God remit sins and punish
when he wishes, it appears that mercy and justice ... do not exist by nature, but
that it is rather the effect of his will." The Polish Brethren, p. 224.
74. Racovian Catechism: "First, nowhere does Scripture_ assert that God is
reconciled to us by Christ but rather that by Christ or his death we are reconciled
or reconciled to God .... Therefore, in no way from all these passages is that
satisfaction to be inferred." Ibid., p. 226. See also The Work of Christ, p. 366,
commenting ori De Jesu, pt. II, ch. vi.
75. Racovian Catechism, The Polish Brethren, p. 229.
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their teaching and exemplary lives. 76 Since moral reformation is
effected by purely natural means as they affect the mind, will, and
affections, there is no need for the supernatural operation of the
Holy Spirit in man's salvation." The logical conclusion of these
departures from orthodoxy is that the church, among other institutions,
has no separate jurisdiction nor unique ministry of reconciliation.
Socinus posed two major criticisms of the satisfaction theory. The
first dealt with the relation of God's justice and mercy; the second
dealt with the justness of vicarious punishment. He argued that there
is no place for forgiveness or mercy if salvation is conditioned upon
a satisfaction of justice. 78 Socinus depicted God as a sovereign lord
and as a private creditor and not as a judge. 79 He granted that a
judge may not relax the demands of justice in civil or criminal cases.
However, a sovereign lord may relax punishment without
compromising justice because punishment is due to the state. Likewise,
creditors may forgive debts without injustice since payment is owed
to them. Therefore, as sovereign lord, God may remit punishment,
and as private creditor, he may forgive debt without injustice. He
said the Reformer's belief that Christ's death is a necessary satisfaction
of justice was sordid and cruel, but he never explained why the
unnecessary suffering of an innocent man was not sordid and cruel.
Socinus missed the mark. The Reformers did not sacrifice mercy
for justice. They taught that God's love and mercy were fully
operative, moving him to provide his own son as a substitutionary
atonement. Socinus' view of forgiveness and salvation is in fact the
greatest tyranny of conscience, and cause for despair, as it is
conditioned on future habitual obedience of the law, something no
one is able to do.
Socinus' second criticism is the most compelling-it is unjust to
punish the innocent in the place of the guilty. 80 The Reformers
answered this criticism by pointing to the absolutely unique spiritual
union between Christ and believers, which Socinus was unwilling to
recognize. This unique relationship renders Christ's vicarious
punishment compatible with justice. The Reformers taught that man's
union with Christ is parallel to man's union with Adam. Adam is
76. The Work of Christ, p. 363, Quoting Harnack, D.O., vol. 3,
ed. n.d.).
77. See the answers to Racovian Catechism questions 7, 8 and 9,
Brethren, pp. 229-30.
78. Racovian Catechism, ibid., p. 227.
79. The Work of Christ, pp. 368-69, summarizing De Jesu, pt. I,
Ill, ch. ii.
80. The Work of Christ, p. 369, summarizing De Jesu, pt. III, ch.

p. 791 (4th
The Polish

ch. i & pt.
iii.
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the federal head of fallen men, and Christ is the head of redeemed
men. Adam's sin is imputed to all men, and Christ's righteousness
is imputed to all redeemed men." This objective union with Christ
exists in eternity, was secured in history, and is experienced subjectively
through the agency of the Holy Spirit. 82
There is a mystery involved in the union of Christ and believers
that must be distinguished from the union involved in the mystical
theory of atonement. Although the church (community) has a ministry
of reconciliation, man is not reconciled to God through prior
reconciliation to the church. Rather, personal union with Christ
through the Holy Spirit is the ground for reconciliation with the
community. 83 Because the mystical theory of atonement denies the
essential duality of God and man, it holds that man's union with
God is effected through his prior union with the community. 84

B.

GOVERNMENTAL THEORY OF ATONEMENT

Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) formulated a mediating position between
the satisfaction and moral influence theories in A Defense of the
Catholic Faith Concerning the Satisfaction of Christ Against Faustus
Socinus." He portrayed Christ's death not as a satisfaction of the
strict demands of justice but as an exemplary punishment designed
to induce faith and obedience through fear. 86
Grotius was especially sensitive to Socinus' criticism that satisfaction
leaves no room for forgiveness, yet he realized scripture clearly depicts
Christ's death as penal. To resolve this tension, Grotius worked a
compromise between justice and mercy by viewing Christ's death as
a lesser substitute for the full satisfaction of justice. By relaxing the
demands of justice God was able to exercise justice and mercy.
81. The Atonement, ch. xiii.
82. The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 3, ch. i, para. I.
83. I Corinthians 12:12-31; Ephesians 2:11-22; Colossians 1:21-23.
84. See infra at 39-46.
85. A Defence of the Catholic Faith Concerning the Satisfaction of Christ,
against Faustus Socinus; John Miley in The Atonement in Christ (1880), gives
perhaps the most systematic and comprehensive defense of the governmental view
by a Wesleyan Arminian. Grotius identified with ~he theology of Jacobus Arminius,
which generally attempts to be a mediating position between Calvinism and Socinianism. Although not all theologians identified as Arminian hold to the governmental
view,. Miley argues that it is the only view consistent with Arminian theology .. Wiley
provides a useful analysis of the atonement views of several Arminian theologians,
some of whom attempt a mediating position between the satisfaction and governmental views. H. Orton Wiley, Christian Theology (1940), pp. 252-59.
86. A Defence of the Catholic Faith Concerning the Satisfaction of Christ,
against Faustus Socinus, pp. 106-7.
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Grotius believed that in matters of justice God holds the office of
ruler not judge, creditor, or sovereign lord." Rulers have the
prerogative of exacting or remitting punishment. 88 However, it is not
a personal prerogative akin to a creditor's in forgiving debt. He may
exercise it only in the best interests of the community. 89 God chose
Christ's death as the most efficient means of deterring lawlessness,
through a demonstration of his hatred of sin and determination to
punish it, without totally destroying man. Socinus and Grotius shared
the critical premise that justice, being a product of God's will rather
than an essential attribute of his nature, is mutable. 90
Making an analogy to, and drawing terminology from, the Roman
civil law, Grotius argued that this relaxation of the law is in fact a
"satisfaction. " 91 But he meant something very different than the
Reformers meant by that term. Grotius agreed that justice would be
satisfied ipso facto if all were consigned to eternal punishment ·as
they deserve. But since God accepted Christ's death in place of man's
eternal death, he was free to place other requirements as a condition
of forgiveness. His condition for salvation is man's meritorious
exercise of faith in God. The fear of punishment invoked by the
specter of Christ's death restrains lawlessness and induces men to
exercise saving faith. 92 For Grotius, salvation is conditioned upon a
meritorious act of man and is not a free gift of God.
Grotius adhered to Arminian theology which teaches that man's
nature is not so corrupted by Adam's sin that he is unable to exercise

87. Ibid., p. 51.
88. Ibid., pp. 55-64.
89. Ibid., p. 64:
[B]ut the right of punishing does not exist for the sake of him who punishes,
but for the sake of the community. For all punishment has as its object the
common good, viz. the preservation of order, and giving an example; so that
desirable punishment has no justification except this cause, while the right of
property and debt are desirable in themselves.

90. Ibid., p. 75:
It is a great error to be afraid, as some are, lest in making such a concession
we do injU:ry to God, as if we made him mutable. The law is not something
internal within God, or the will of God itself, but only an effect of that will.
It is perfectly certain that the effects of the divine will are mutable.
But Grotius makes the same application of principle to Christ's death, quoting
approviitgly several of the Church Fathers that Christ's death was not necessary.
Ibid., p. 103.
91. Ibid., pp. 121-27.
92. Ibid., pp. 127-28.
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some positive spiritual good!' All men have the present natural
ability to repent and exercise saving faith without the immediate
supernatural work of the Holy Spirit. 94 Repentance and faith actually
precede regeneration in this view!' Man's meritorious acts are decisive
in effecting his salvation, though he can be powerfully influenced by
the example of Christ's suffering and death. In such a system, the
primary effect of Christ's death is to change man's disposition toward
God and not God's toward man.
In order to answer Socinus' second criticism, that it is unjust to
punish an innocent Christ in the place of guilty man, Grotius did
not appeal to the mystery of a special spiritual union of Christ and
his elect. Quite surprisingly, he argued that there is nothing in the
law of nature or customs of nations that prohibits such a practice.%
Scriptural injunctions to the contrary were mere positive law applicable
only to Israel." For the community good, a ruler may punish an
innocent man who bears a special relationship to the offender, such
as father and son, for the purpose of deterring others."
While Grotius ostensibly sought to defend the satisfaction theory,
he actually embraced the principles of the moral influence theory.
Grotius and Socinus concurred that punitive justice is merely a matter
of God's will remissible without satisfaction. In Arminian and Socinian
theology, Christ's death is unnecessary for man's salvation, but
repentance and faith are a meritorious condition of forgiveness and
remission of punishment. 99 Both the governmental and moral influence
theories of atonement are essentially utilitarian in nature. Christ's
death was chosen as the most efficient means of inducing a change
93. A.A. Hodge, Outlines of Theology (reprint 1972) (1879), p. 334. Some
Arminians believe this is so because man's nature was only partially corrupted by
the fall. Others believe there was a total corruption but that the effect of the
atonement was to raise all men to the level of partial corruption. Arminianism
attempts to be a mediating position between Pelagianism (man is unaffected by
Adam's sin) and Augustinianism (man is totally corrupted by Adam's sin).
94. John Miley, Systematic Theology (reprint 1989), vol. 2, p. 244; See also
ibid., vol. I, p. 522.
95. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 251-52.
96. A Defence of the Catholic Faith Concerning the Satisfaction .of Christ,
against Faustus Socinus, pp. 81-101.
97. Ibid., pp. 83-84.
98. Ibid., p. 86.
99. Although Grotius charged Socinus with improperly applying the Roman
private law doctrine of acceptilatio to the atonement, Grotius in principle does the
same thing. See The Polish Brethren, pp. 256, 282-83 n.25, 285 n.80. See also The
Work of Christ, pp. 401, 417. In effect, Arminianism and Socinianism both reject
the chief cornerstone of the Reformation that "salvation is by grace rather than
--
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in man through natural means of moral example rather than by the
supernatural work of the Holy Spirit.
C.

DETERRENCE

Rehabilitation parallels the moral influence theory and deterrence
the governmental theory. Although rehabilitation has been the favored
utilitarian theory of criminologists, deterrence has enjoyed a certain
preeminence in philosophical discussions. For this reason deterrence
is discussed first, and then rehabilitation. This is a reversal of the
order in which their corresponding theories of atonement were
presented. The deterrence theory holds that persons should be
punished, on the occasion of their conviction, to deter them (special
deterrence) or others (general deterrence) from future crimes through
fear of punishment.")() Change of behavior, not change of character,
is the focus.
The deterrence theory finds its modern roots in Jeremy Bentham's
(1849-1832) classic formulation of utilitarianism. Actions are justified
which produce the greatest pleasure for the greatest number. As man
possesses rationality and free will, he seeks to maximize his pleasure
and minimize his pain. The state can alter behavior of the populace
by raising the risk and pain of exemplary punishment to the point
it outweighs the pleasure of some forbidden act. 101 Since punishment
is always seen as evil, even when imposed on the guilty, it is justified
only when it prevents a greater evil.
The chief practical criticism of deterrence is that it has never
proven effective. Of the few scientific studies conducted, most deal
with capital punishment, many are methodologically flawed, and they
draw contradictory conclusions. 102 Andenaes, perhaps the leading
proponent of deterrence, acknowledges that there is no evidence of
special deterrence. However, he appeals to common sense and
experience claiming that punishment works as a general deterrent
even though he admits there is no way the claim can be proven. 103
100. Jobs Andenaes, "General Prevention-Illusion or Reality?" 43 J. Crim. L.,
C & P.S. (1952), pp. 176, 179-80. Andenaes responds to the charge that deterrence
is a shallow theory of punishment based only on fear.
101. J. Bentham, The Rationale of Punishment (1830), pp. 19-41, quoted in
Criminal Law, pp. 8-9.
102. Crime, Guilt, and Punishment, pp. 8-12. Ten and others rely heavily on
Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on
Crime Rates (Alfred Blumstein et al., eds. 1978).
103. Johannes Andenaes, "The General Preventive Effects of Punishment," 114
U. Pa. L. Rev. (1966), p. 949.
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The primary theoretical criticism of deterrence is that it justifies
punishing the innocent and places. no inherent limit on the amount
of punishment, thus violating the principles of blameworthiness and
proportionality . 104 Since all punishment is evil, whether imposed on
the innocent or guilty, it is justified only if it results in a net
maximization of pleasure or minimization of pain. The evil of
punishing an innocent person could be outweighed by the evil prevented
in deterring crime. Similarly, severely punishing a petty offender is
justified if that evil is outweighed by the cumulative effect of deterring
many petty offenders.
One response to this criticism is that inflicting suffering on the
innocent is not punishment. This leaves the basic moral issues
unresolved. What justifies inflicting suffering on the innocent? 105 The
second response is to claim that there is never a utilitarian advantage
in punishing the innocent as less obvious evils will result. The debate
takes the form of posing hypotheticals and counter-hypotheticals
designed to show that the greater good will, or will not, be promoted
by punishing the innocent. The hypotheticals that present seemingly
clear situations in which it is beneficial to punish the innocent are
extremely unlikely to occur. This leads to a third response that it is
only in fantastic situations that it is beneficial to punish the innocent.
Ten's analysis of the debate is rather convincing in its conclusion
that the use of fantastic examples plays a legitimate role.I'16
In an attempt to resolve the problems of blameworthiness and
proportionality, several writers have offered compromise theories
incorporating retributive principles. H.L.A. Hart's theory,
distinguishing punishment as a general justifying aim based on utility
from distribution of punishment based on retributive principles, is
the best known. 107 He believes that the utility of deterrence is the
only rational justification for punishment in general. However,
distribution of punishment in individual cases is limited by
blameworthiness and proportionality. The state may punish only the
guilty, and only so much as they deserve, regardless of the social
gain of exceeding those limits. At the cost of theoretical inconsistency

104. Crime, Guilt, and Punishment, pp. 13-14, 141; Punishment and Responsi.
bility, pp. 24-25, 233-37.
105. Crime, Guilt, and Punishment, pp. 14-17.
106. Ibid., pp. 17-18.
107. Punishment and Responsibility, pp. 1-27. For other compromise theories see
Crime, Guilt, and Punishment, pp. 78-81; John Rawls, "Two Concepts of Rules,"
Philosophical Review (1955), p. 4, reprinted in The Philosophy of Punishment (H.B.
Acton, ed. 1969), p. 105.
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Hart disposes of one problem only to acquire the retributivist's main
problem of determining how much punishment is "deserved" as an
upper limit.
These criticisms avoid the most fundamental weakness of deterrence
and all utilitarian approaches-the unsuitability of empiricism as a
viable methodology for social study and prediction. 10'
D.

REHABILITATION

For nearly a century (1870-1970) the rehabilitation theory held
sway as the "enlightened" rationale for corrections. Crime is viewed
as pathological, requiring treatment based on a medical model of
diagnosis and prescription.H" A sentence is designed to "effect changes
in the characters, attitudes, and behavior of convicted offenders, so
as to strengthen the social defense against unwanted behavior, but
also to contribute to the welfare and satisfactions of offenders." 110
Rehabilitation is generally premised on a deterministic view of behavior
found in the positivist school of criminology. Theories of crime
causation vary from individualistic factors of biology and psychology
to social forces."'
Despite a deterministic view of human nature, professionals engaged
in the healing process have acquired the free will necessary to remold
others by means of education, counseling, psychotherapy, and
vocational training. 112 More radical treatment includes electroshock,
drug therapy, and psychosurgery (lobotomies).'" Although socioeconomic factors are generally considered the major cause of crime,
the approach is not to change society so much as to enable individuals
to cope successfully within the established order . 114 However, because
society is at fault it has a corresponding duty to provide programmatic
cures. Those treatment programs which promote the greatest reduction
in crime at the least cost are justified.

108. Infra at 47-50.
109. George B. Void & Thomas J. Bernard, Theoretical Criminology (3d ed.
1986), pp. 350-51.
110. Francis A. Allen, The Decline of.the Rehabilitative Ideal (1981), p. 2.
Ill. Theoretical Criminology, cbs. I, 3·14. Void deals with biological causes in
cbs. 3-6, psychological in ch. 7, and social in cbs. 8-14. See The Decline of the
Rehabilitative Ideal, pp. 40-42.
112. Ibid., pp. 11-16, 43; Crime and Its Victims, pp. 74-80; Theoretical Criminology, pp. 350-51.
113. The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal, p. 25; Fred Cohen, The Law of
Deprivation of Liberty (1980), pp. 540-47.
114. See Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (1957).
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The demise of the rehabilitation theory is due to a loss of faith in
the ability to rehabilitate 115 and ideological attacks by critical
criminologists of the extreme left. 116 Perhaps the single greatest blow
to the theory was Robert Martinson's research and conclusions that
nothing works. m
While the layman's perception of rehabilitation is that it is too
soft on criminals, most scholarly criticism focuses on the fact that
in practice it is cruel and arbitrary.U' Because diagnosis and treatment
is necessarily an ongoing process based on a cumulation of knowledge
about the inmate, sentences must be indeterminate. The inmate's
cooperation in mandatory programs designed to change his character
is the condition of release. Because sentencing decisions are not based
on culpability there is great disparity in prison terms, thus violating
the principle of proportionality. Convicts especially hate the process
because they deem it unfair.
A consistent application of the rehabilitative premise that criminals
are not morally responsible would work a drastic change in criminal
law and procedure. Every offense would be strict liability as attention
shifts from mens rea to the question of whether a defendant did
·certain acts or caused a particular harm.n• Mental state, if relevant
at all, would be determined by mental health experts as part of a
treatment program. Writers have expended much effort to make the
basic doctrines of mens rea and defenses compatible with the utilitarian
ethics of deterrence and rehabilitation. 12o
Likewise, procedural safeguards such as proof beyond a reasonable
doubt and the privilege against self incrimination, which make it
more difficult to identify the sick, make little sense. Nor would it
make sense to initiate proceedings only after a crime is committed if
115. See The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal. pp. 26-31.
116. Ibid., pp. 34-40, 64-65; Theoretical Criminology, chs. 15 & 16; William
Chambliss, "Toward a Radical Criminology," in The Politics of Law (David Kairys,
ed. 1982), p. 230.
117 .. Robert Martinson, "What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison
Reform," 35 Pub. Int. (Spring 1974), p. 22. His views were modified in "New
Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing Reform," 7 Hofstra
L. Rev. (1979), p. 243.
118. The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal, pp.· 47-54; C.S. Lewis, "The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment," 3 20th Century (Autumn 1948-49), p. 5,
reprinted in Theories of Punishment, p. 301.
119. Barbara Wootton, Crime and the Criminal Law (1963). This approach is
critiqued in Punishment and Responsibility, pp. 195-209 and Crime, Guilt, and
Punishment, pp. 110-22.
120. Crime, Guilt, and Punishment, pp. 86-122; Punishment and Responsibility,
pp. 28-53, 113-57.
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there is reason to believe a person will commit a crime. Logically, a
comprehensive system of civil commitment would divest criminal law
and procedure. 121
Deterrists have criticized rehabilitation because its effect is limited
to convicts and has no impact on potential offenders. The
rehabilitationist might respond that a rational policy would include
a preventive program of social hygiene that encompasses all potential
offenders. It is plausibly argued that this makes more sense than
trying to control the entire population through fear.
The radical left attacks these "mainline" liberals for betraying
those it claims to champion. Rehabilitationists maintain a system
designed to inculcate middle class values and belief in the neutrality
of law . 122 Worse yet they do. it to protect their own vested personal
and economic interests in the government bureaucracy. Radicals
believe crime is not a matter of individual pathology, but rather the
ability of dominant groups to define the conduct of dominated groups
as criminal. 123 The entire social structure must be altered, replacing
domination with solidarity.
Utilitarian criminal sanctions, just like utilitarian theories of
atonement, are primarily designed to effect a change in the offender
rather than to satisfy justice. Justice and reconciliation become nearly
synonymous with social order, and law is the immediate instrument
to that end. Both deterrence and rehabilitation sever law from
morality, though in different ways. Deterrence views man as a free
and rational decision-maker who acts on a hedonistic principle of
maximizing pleasure rather than the rationality of ethical discernment
of right and wrong. The state is therefore able to alter social behavior
by manipulating pain and pleasure through the instrumentality of
law. The rehabilitationist views man as a product of deterministic
forces, or as sick rather than morally blameworthy. Treatment is
then little more than behavioral conditioning designed to enforce
social conformity through the instrumentality of law. The logic of
both is perfectly compatible with the positivist view that law has no
necessary moral content.
Both Grotius and Socinus believed that Christ's death was an
unnecessary, but highly expedient, means to change man and preserve
order. Utilitarian civil sanctions, like Christ's death, are selected for
121. N. Kittrie, "The Divestment of Criminal Law and the Coming of the
Therapeutic State," I Suffolk U. L. Rev. (1967), pp. 43, 44.
122. See Theoretical Criminology, p. 13; See also Chambliss, "Toward a Radical
Criminology. •'

123. E.g., Void & Bernard, supra note 109, at 15.

244

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE (1993)

their expediency to a particular end. These utilitarian views of
atonement were quite compatible with, and perhaps smoothed the
way for, an emerging view of the state which was becoming less
concerned with exaction of perfect justice in individual cases, and
more concerned with law as an instrument for advancing a particular
vision of the common good. 124
Just as Arminian and Socinian theology confuse the work of Christ
and the Holy Spirit, utilitarian views of civil justice confuse the roles
of state and church. In neither is the immediate supernatural work
of the Holy Spirit crucial for reconciliation, but rather the exemplary
impact of Christ's death by means of fear and moral suasion is
decisive. Both of these are essentially natural means of reformation,
equally available to the state, undermining the church's institutional
distinctiveness. As the church compromises its ministry of
reconciliation, the state assumes it to the eventual neglect of its
ministry of justice.
Ill.
A.

COMMUNITARIAN THEORIES OF ATONEMENT AND CIVILJUSTICE
MYSTICAL THEORY OF ATONEMENT

The mystical theory is like the moral influence in that Christ's
death plays no essential role in man's salvation, and atonement is
exclusively a subjective change in man. The crucial difference is that
in the mystical theory this change .occurs because the incarnation
effects a mystical union between God and man that imparts a new
principle of life. The mystical theory has been a recurring one in
Church history;m however, until the nineteenth century it found
neither widespread allegiance nor comprehensive development. This
changed dramatically when the "father of modern theology," Friedrich
Schleiermacher (1768-1834), articulated a mystical view of Christ's
person and work in The Christian Faith. 12 6
Schleiermacher rejected the natural theology of Enlightenment
rationalism and Protestant orthodoxy. He defined true religion as
the sense of absolute dependence (God-consciousness), which is known
immediately through feeling and contemplation. This feeling of
absolute dependence is the veritable and essential existence of God
124. The Words of Christ, pp. 404-09.
125. See Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, (photolithoprint 1979) (1892) vol.
2, pp. 581-89; The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 2, ch xii, paras. 5-7;
The Work of Christ, pp. 327-33; 361n.9; 54ln.3.
126. F. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith (D. Bailie et al., trans. 1928) (1st ed.
1821, 2d ed. 1831).
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in man. 127 Sin is the failure to hold a conscious awareness of one's
unity with God and absolute dependence on him. According to
Schleiermacher, man is both spirit which is inherently God-conscious,
and flesh which lacks God-consciousness. 128 Because flesh develops
earlier than spirit it retards the development of God-consciousness. 129
When spirit becomes aware that flesh is retarding its determinative
power, man experiences guilt and suffering. 130
This condition is man's created nature and is not the penal
consequence of Adam's sin."' Adam's sin, like everyone's, was
trivial, but it has a social impact that further encumbers the individual's
struggle for God-consciousness. Schleiermacher believed that sin "is
best represented as the corporate act and the corporate guilt of the
human race." 132 To deny corporate guilt would throw man upon his
individual resources for salvation.'"
Schleiermacher believed that all men are conscious of their need
for a Redeemer. Christ the Redeemer differs from other men "by
the constant potency of his God-consciousness. " 134 By the incarnation
Christ entered into the common life of humanity, participating in it
and communicating his God-consciousness to it. He assumes man
into the power of his God-consciousness (redemption)"' and into his
127. Ibid., p. 17.
128. Schleiermacher believed that there are three grades of consciousness. The
lowest is that of animals and children. Although this state is unknown to us, it is
generally agreed that while there is consciousness, it is not the kind that is objective
or introspective, or that makes a distinction between self and others. The second
stage involves a genuine self-consciousness. At this stage self-consciousness experiences a conflict between feelings of dependence and freedom. Schleiermacher's fleshspirit dichotomy is not a Manichean dualism of material and non-material, nor the
orthodox Christian view of conflict between the remaining sin nature and new life
in the Spirit. Rather, it is the inability of the feeling of absolute dependence or
God-consciousness to control. Ibid., pp. 18-20. The third grade is absolute dependence or God-consciousness.
129. Ibid., p. 274.
130. Ibid., pp. 355-61.
131. Ibid., p. 291.
132. Ibid., p. 285. See also Ibid., pp. 287-88:
Now if the sinfulness which is prior to all action operates in every individual
through the sin and sinfulness of others, and if, again, it is transmitted by the
voluntary actions of every individual to others and implanted within them, it
must be something genuinely common to all . ... This solidarity means an
interdependence of all places and all times in the respect we have in view . .. .
(A]nd the aggregate power of the flesh in its conflict with the spirit ... is
intelligible only by reference to the totality of those sharing a common life,
and never fully in any one part. ...
133. Ibid., p. 289.
134. Ibid., p. 385.
135. Ibid., p. 425.
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blessedness, alleviating the suffering of guilt (reconciliation). 136 Christ
continues to exert a saving influence by an immediate communication
of God-consciousness through the church. Therefore, it is now through
union with the community that individuals are assumed into Christ's
God-consciousness and experience union with God.B'
Because Schleiermacher's salvation is a purely subjective work in
man, accomplished by Christ alone, there is no place for the distinctive
person and work of the Holy Spirit. He uses standard theological
terms such as "regeneration," "justification," and "sanctification"
to refer to nothing more than Christ's redeeming activities.'" There
is real doubt as to whether even Christ and the church play an
essential role in man's salvation since every individual and community
has the potential to develop, and assume others into, Godconsciousness.'" It may be fair to say that man is already reconciled
to God and he need only become consciously aware of that reality.
Since Schleiermacher, modernism has taken many theological forms
including liberalism 140 and neo-orthodoxy .' 41 They have in common
a purely subjective effect of the work of Christ. Although no single
school dominates the theological landscape today, the Latin American
form of process theology, known as liberation theology, is of special
interest because of its influence and explicit relation to civil justice.
It teaches that salvation comes in siding with the oppressed in their
struggle for liberation. Most criticism focuses on its attendant Marxist
social, economic, and political ideology without doing full justice to
its underlying theology. Leonardo Boff's Jesus Christ Liberator, 142 is
the most comprehensive articulation of a liberation Christo logy.
136. Ibid., p. 431.
137. Ibid., p. 363:
[T]he recognition of the sinless perfection in Jesus Christ, definitely constraining
us to the new corporate life, must in the same Way be still His work. But there

is given to us instead of His personal influence, only that of His fellowship, in
so far as even the picture of Him which is found in the Bible also originated
in the community and is perpetuated in it.

138. Ibid., p. 477.
139. Ibid., p. 563:
The unity of the Spirit is to be understood in' the same sense as the unity which

everyone attributes to the characteristic form taken by human nature in a
nation; even those who ascribe being only to the separate individual may still
say that each man's personality is the national character modified by the original
basis of his own nature.

See also Ibid., pp. 34-39, 62-76.
140. See generally James C. Livingston, Modern Christian Thought: From the
Enlightenment to Vatican II, (1971), pp. 251-57, 262-68.
141. Cornelius Van Til, Barth's Christo/ogy (1977) (assessment of Karl Barth's
Christology as mystical).
142. Leonardo Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator (trans., 1978).
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Boff says that the world is growing in complexity, unity and
consciousness as it proceeds through a series of stages culminating
in the divinization of man and the humanization of God. 143 Sin is
viewed as a lack of unity, or alienation of one from another, resulting
in the domination of some groups by others. Although oppressive
social structures may reinforce alienation, the root cause of sin is
the fact that mankind has not progressed past the stage of
anthropogenesis to Christogenesis. There is an animating principle
of harmony in the cosmos which has always worked unconsciously
but apparently teleologically. It is now working with a growing sense
of self-consciousness in man. that enables him to direct the course of
progress toward universal solidarity, and thus, sinlessness. 144 Jesus
acts as something of a catalyst permeating mankind with a sense of
community that increases man's self-conscious directing powers."'
Christ is sinless by virtue of the fact that he lived with a conscious
awareness of the harmony of the world, and he works to liberate
victims of sin by establishing a classless solidarity.I'6 He is the ultimate
human being that all will become. 147 Having penetrated the world,
Jesus mystically entered the unconsciousness of mankind and is now
present in all reality "acting and fermenting the goodness, humanity,
brotherhood, communion, and love in all human beings.""' His
death was unnecessary and certainly had no penal significance, yet
it displayed his solidarity with the poor and love for their oppressors.
Because the poor are especially close to God, and he lies "hidden
and anonymous" in them, the most direct access to God is through
union with them. 149 Active participation in the cause of the poor is
the way of salvation, and Christ is present in those who further their
cause."0 The commitment of one's life to the oppressed results in
143. Ibid., pp. 185, 197.
144. Ibid., pp. 234-35:
Cosmogenesis gave rise to biogenesis, anthropogenesis emerged from biogenesis,
and from anthropogenesis there emerged Christogenesis . ... The reality that
surrounds us is not a chaos but a cosmos, a harmony. The more it progresses
the more complex it becomes; the more c9mplex it becomes the more it is
unified, the more it is unified the more it becomes conscious of itself. ... In
this perspective, the human being does not emerge as an error in calculation
... but as the point where the global process becomes conscious of itself and
begins to direct itself.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

p. 24.
p. 202.
p. 241.
p. 218.
pp. 284-85.
p. 219.
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the formation of "a planetary, ecumenical, and communal
consciousness among people in search of a new humanism."'"
Boff gives no specific description of this new order except that it
will be free of domination and alienation, and man will hold
membership in a universal rather than a particular family. 152 Such a
world will not be governed by law but only a love "that bind[s]
human beings with more liberating ties than those of the law."'"
God does not speak to man revealing a plan for society or in
propositional truths. Only when we insert ourselves into Christ's life
and the cause of the oppressed can we begin to comprehend the
meaning and unity of the new order of existence. " 4
B.

SociAL JusTICE

Social justice is an ambiguous term invoked for its emotional
appeal in promoting a vast array of programs designed to make
society just.'" It differs from the other theories in that it uses state
coercion, usually to redistribute property or impair liberty, without
any adjudication of wrongdoing. This multiplies the rehabilitationist's
techniques of social control and applies them to the entire populace.'"
Rather than using the adjudication of wrongs as an occasion to
promote some vision of the good, the state engages in an increasingly
comprehensive, continuous, and purposive intervention in all social
affairs. Regardless of the source of a problem, social justice demands
that the state take corrective action.'"
The frrst large-scale social justice program was compulsory schooling
with its now flickering hope of curing most social ills.'" In this
century, regulation of the economy gave rise to the administrative
state, redistribution of property gave rise to the welfare state and
institutional care gave rise to the therapeutic state. The focus of
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
"The

p. 236.
p. 77.
p. 195.
p. 182.
absence of a dominant theorist or a single commanding system of

thought endorsing the welfaie state has been documented again and again." Sidney

Hook, "'Welfare State'-a Debate that Isn't," in The Welfare State (E.I. Schottland,
ed. 1967), p. 167, quoted in Ronald H. Nash, Social Justice and the Christian
Church (1983), p. 59.
156. Kittrie, "The Divestment of Criminal Law and the Coming of the Therapeutic
State," pp. 54-55.
!57. F.A. Hayek, New Studies (1978), p. 110.
158. See E.I.F. Williams, Horace Mann: Educational Statesman (1937), pp. 248·
49, quoting from "Introduction," 3 The Common Sch. J. (Jan. 1, 1841), p. 15.
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justice has shifted from equality of opportunity to equality of
position. 159 At the same time, criminologists shifted attention to social ·•
causes of crime. Since society is at fault it must redress the problems
of illiteracy, poverty, housing, unemployment, malnutrition, substance
abuse, and broken homes. The state usurps the role of families, 160
church, and voluntary associations, which in turn default on their
responsibilities with the ready excuse that only the state has adequate
professional skills and resources to deal with the problems. 161
There are two types of attack on social justice theories, the first
being that by every standard of measurement nothing works. The
second type of attack is ideological in nature. Pervasive state
intervention, guided only by the utilitarian goal of maximizing net
social gains, threatens individual liberty. 161 John Rawls' celebrated
treatise, A Theory of Justice, 163 attempts to resolve the conflict
between individual liberty and the redistributive ethic of utilitarianism.
Rawls distinguishes activities governed by the principle of liberty
which can never be compromised, from economic rights which may
be sacrificed for the common good. 164 He develops these two principles
from an imaginary social contract which everyone could agree to.
The institution of compulsory education, potentially the greatest
threat to liberty, will presumably play the indispensable role of
ensuring allegiance to the two principles. The extreme political left
is also critical of state-imposed values, however, their complaint is
not so much against imposed values as it is with the content of the
values being imposed.
Utilitarian theories of justice have not worked, and they conflict
with certain shared notions of fairness, yet they enjoy the continuing

159. See Edgar Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and Method of the
Law (1974), pp. 229-36.
160. See The Decline· of the Rehabilitative Ideal, pp. 15, 20-21.
161. "The Divestment of Criminal Law and the Coming of the Therapeutic
State," p. 56; A. A. Stone, Mental Health and Law: A System in Transition(l915),
pp. 1-6, excerpted in The Law of Deprivation of Liberty, pp. 214ff.
162. The tension that exists between individual liberty and social justice notions
of the common good is addressed in Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and Method
of the Law, pp. 240.45.
163. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971).
164. Rawls' two principles are:
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty
compatible with a similar liberty for others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are
both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached
to positions and offices open to all. Ibid., p. 60.
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perception of being empirically verifiable, and therefore, scientific. 165
This is based on the pretension that given time the "social sciences"
will make the same types of evaluations and predictions as the natural
sciences. In reality, there are a seemingly infinite number of variables,
most of which cannot be controlled for purposes of experimentation,
making it impossible to trace cause-effect relations of social
phenomena. Therefore, it is impossible to empirically predict the
effect of social policy decisions. Without proving a theory of causation,
policy-makers set out to treat the entire populace by prescription.
The fact that the 'entire enterprise is based on· empirically unproven
and unprovable assumptions is usually ignored.
Not only is the utilitarian unable to select an efficient means to
the desired end, he is unable to justify a particular end as good.
Even if there is a shared vision of the good, there is no assurance
that it is "good" indeed and would not be more painful than
pleasurable. This problem becomes especially critical as social
consensus regarding "the good" breaks down. 166 Although utilitarian
theories have enjoyed relative immunity to criticism at these
fundamental points, Roberto Unger attests the desperate predicament
of the prevailing methodology:
If he [the historicist] wants to maintain clear lines of causality, in

which cause and effect are neatly matched in one-to-one sequences,
he has to tear certain events out of the "seamless web" of history,
in which everything seems to bear on everything else. But in so
doing he willfully disfigures the truth of history which it is his
aim to establish ....
Suppose the historicist refuses to sacrifice complex historical
truth on the altar of one-way causation. . . . Having discovered
that all things cause each other in social life, as in the world at
large, he wants to find a way to represent this insight in what he
says about society. Alas, his eagerness is self-defeating. The more
causes he takes into account, the less he is able to distinguish
discrete relationships of cause and effect. In the end, the very
notion of causality flounders in ambiguity .167
Unger also rejects rationalism and individual subjectivism, 168 and
in his search for a suitable methodology for social study, concludes

165. See, e.g., Theoretical Criminology, pp. 36, 340-363; "The Divestment of
Criminal Law and the Coming of the Therapeutic State," pp. 58-60.
166. The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideals, pp. 36-37.
167. Law in Modern Society, pp. 12-13.
168. Ibid., pp. 1-23.
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Knowledge and Politics with a petition for divine revelation.'" One
possible solution to the problem of knowing anything truly without
knowing everything is that God, the omniscient Creator, has revealed
truth to man, his creation. It does not appear that Unger's prayer
is directed to the God of orthodox Christianity. Unger believes that
in order to solve the knowledge problem we must resolve the problem
of social order, which is the reconciliation of man.
Perhaps the fundamental problem to be resolved in all thought is
the relationship of universals and particulars. In political and social
discourse it takes the form of the relationship of the individual to
the group. How can you have community without destroying individual
freedom? The problem appears rooted .in the nature of things.
Consciousness is a person's awareness that he (subject) is separate
from others (object). "Otherness" creates two problems. First,
another's freedom places limits on our own freedom. Secondly, there
is no assurance that object and subject share the same perspective
or attribute the same meaning to events. Alienation is a product of
this basic reality of "separateness." Resolving these problems and
working toward "the ideal of a universal community, is the great
political task of modern societies," 170 but "[a]ll moves toward such
a community may be compromised by the separateness of persons." 171
Unger writes that the ideology of nineteenth-century liberal society
was one in which men were "governed by self-interest" and used
the "most efficient means to achieve privately chosen aims. " 172
According to Unger, social cohesion was supposedly based on
impersonal respect, rather than solidarity and a shared vision of
good. The role of law was to ensure individual rights as a protection
against the state, to mediate private disputes, and to influence private
decisions by sanctions. The rule of law is based on the belief that
law is mutually beneficial, neutral and objective. In such a society
there is no true community, and law merely accentuates and reinforces
169. Roberto M. Unger, Knowledge and Politics (1984), p. 295:
Desirous of faith, touched by hope, and moved by love, men look unceasingly
for God. Their search for Him continues where thinking must stop and action
fail. And in their vision of Him they find the beginning and the end of their
knowledge of the world and of their sympathy for others. So is man's meditation
on God a final union of thought and love-love which is thought disembodied
from language and restored to its source.
But our days pass, and still we do not know you fully. Why then do you
remain silent? Speak, God.
170. Law in Modern Society, p. 266.
171. Ibid., p. 258.
172. Ibid., p. 24.
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separateness. The role of law in the post-liberal welfare-corporate
state has changed. A social order based on private interest is no
longer viewed as natural, and the belief that law is neutral and
objective is questioned. With the rise of policy-oriented legal reasoning
and substantive justice, rights are less a protection of individuals and
more of a justification for the state's purposive reordering of the
social order. Property and contract rights are no longer seen as
neutral, but rather as political instruments of the established powers. 173
Unger believes that this changing perception of law reflects a
change in social consciousness that is giving expression to a desire
for community. There can be no return to a rule of law because it
is based on an individualistic conception of society. However, Unger
warns that a continuation of the trends of the welfare-corporate state
will be a loss of individual freedom "to a bureaucratic welfare
tyranny that treats all social arrangements as subjects for governmental
manipulation through regulatory law."'" Although there is a desire
for community, current social organization and methodologies are
not able to give expression to it.
Unger ties the resolution of the problem of social order to the
problem of methodology. The creation of true community, based on
solidarity, requires a methodology we do not possess. Yet the
development of a new methodology for social study and predication
depends on development of community. A new methodology must
reflect the interrelatedness of social life, eliminate determinism, and
resolve the problem of objectivity-subjectivity. So we return to the
question-who is the God that Unger asks to speak?
What philosophy states as the union of the universal and the
particular, religion knows as immanence. What philosophy describes as the separation of the universal aild the particular, religion
calls transcendence. m

The idea of a union of immanence and transcendence or of a
universal being who knows and determines all particulars without
destroying their particularity is the idea of God. 176
Unger assumes that the resolution of the problems of social order
and methodology lies in the human consciousness. It appears that it
is not a subjective individual consciousness, but rather a universal
interpersonal collective consciousness that is God. The problem of

173.
174.
175.
176.

Ibid., pp. 192-220.
Ibid., p. 129; see also ibid., pp. 216-23.
Knowledge and Politics, p. 290.
Ibid., p. 291.
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legitimizing a social order, and the resolution of the problem of
meaning, is resolved because object and subject are one. This new
order is governed by solidarity, which Unger calls the social analogue
of love, rather than a rule of law which is predicated on a lack of
community. 177 Solidarity means treating someone as a person and not
just a "bearer of formally equal rights and duties." 178
Unger trusts that there is an existing unity of all things to which
we must be open. He also believes that there is a correspondence in
human nature between being and goodness that cannot manifest itself
in a context of domination. Man must act in faith upon this belief,
and this faith is expressed through politics. 179 Politics is key to altering
social structure through "transformative praxis" and altering the
consciousness through the "imaginative powers of the mind."
Community then advances through a spiral of increasing solidarity
and decreasing domination. 180 However, awareness of unity cannot
develop absent face-to-face relationships with other members of the
same group across the whole spectrum of life's activities. 181 In such
a setting, "[t]hough the law may be framed to teach men sympathy,
all that may be hoped for in the short run is to force them, within
wider or narrower bounds, to act as if they were sympathetic. " 182 It
is not immediately obvious that this is preferable to a "bureaucratic
welfare tyranny." It is also difficult to see how this resolves the
problems of causation and objectivity-subjectivity without destroying
freedom and the individual.
Unger's prayer makes it clear that he recognizes the limitation of
thought and action in effecting man's salvation. What then is to take
place in the context of these compulsory comprehensive face-to-face
relationships? He must reject a view of reconciliation paralleling the
moral influence theory of atonement that would establish reconciliation
through rationalistic devices of teaching and exemplary love. Instead,
Unger's methodology is akin to Schleiermacher's and Boff's, requiring
a setting in which there is an immediate mystical impartation of the
higher consciousness from the spiritual haves to the have-nots.
177. Law in Modern Society, pp. 206-07.
178. Ibid., p. 206. The family is a great inspiration for this vision of community
because in it members relate on the basis of love. In true community all members
would relate in a similar manner. Yet Unger says the family is a foe that must be
transformed because it competes with the universal community for the allegiance of
its members. Knowledge and Politics, p. 264.
179. Law in Modern Society. pp. 247-48.
180. Knowledge and Politics. p. 239.
181. Ibid., pp. 262-67.
182. Law in Modern Society, p. 215.
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In both the mystical and social justice views, issues of individual
sin, and guilt as moral wrongs, are minimized or eliminated. The
focus is on establishing a particular order, or effecting a change of
relationship, without a satisfaction of justice. In effect, it is
reconciliation without atonement and community without satisfaction
of justice. The mystical view of atonement eliminates the duality
between God and man, and in so doing, eliminates the separateness
of individuals. Social justice, to overcome the problems of the
welfare-corporate state, eliminates the separateness of individuals,
and in so doing creates a new god. In both the mystical and social
justice theories, corporate man and god are one. This would resolve
the legitimacy problem that arises when some individuals or groups
try to impose a particular order on others. However, if all are one,
the problem of maintaining true individuality and freedom reasserts
itself. Neither of the theories offers a convincing answer to this
dilemma.
Both assume that there is a basic unity, either of God and man,
or of all men, and that the alienation they experience is not so much
a moral problem as it is a metaphysical problem. It seems that the
problem of alienation will be resolved when man becomes fully
conscious of this metaphysical unity, and his oneness, with God and
others. While Schleiermacher focuses on contemplation as the key to
the higher consciousness, others focus on political activity as the key.
The mystical views of atonement not only limit the importance of
Christ's death, they are usually accompanied by a denial of the
existence of the Holy Spirit as a distinct person in the Trinity. This
is paralleled in the social justice theories in which the state becomes
preeminent, consigning other institutions to irrelevance. In Unger's
view, the logical conclusion would be that state and society are one.
Although Unger suggests that in his new society there would be
multiple organic groups, they appear to be nothing more than
particular expressions of the universal community .183 There is no need
for a church since the state plays a redemptive rather than judicial
role. In fact, the church would have to be eliminated as it contends
there are two communities of men-saved and unsaved. Additionally,
orthodox Christianity, which believes there is a duality between the
Creator and creation, would be eliminated because it provides the
theoretical basis for the rule of law notion that there is an objective
and neutral standard. " 4
183. Knowledge and Politics, pp. 236-77.
184. See Law in Modern Society, pp. 76-83.
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CoNCLUSION

Although my primary aim has not been to offer a comprehensive
case for a particular view of atonement and civil justice, I have
argued that only the satisfaction and retribution-restitution views are
distinctly different and justifiable in terms of Christian theology and
a biblical worldview. It is a larger and more basic matter still to
offer a defense of one's worldview. Perhaps that is why most writers
do not even try to articulate the basic presuppositions from which
they work. The fact of the matter is that everyone operates on the
basis of certain presuppositions, whether they do so self-consciously
and honestly or not. Recognizing that these presuppositions are based
on faith does not mean that they must be at odds with knowledge
or operate in a separate realm. Rather we believe that we might
know, and there is a wonderful communion between thought, action
and faith that is properly grounded.
For it is true that the more richly we are nourished in Holy
Scripture by the things that feed us through obedience, the more
accurately we are carried along to the things that satisfy through
knowledge .... Certainly this is just what I say: He who will not
believe will not understand. For he who will not believe will not
gain experience, and he who has not had experience will not
know. 18 ~

185. Anselm, "Letter of Anselm to Pope Urban II," in A Scholastic Miscellany:
Anselm to Ockham, pp. 97, 97-98.

